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We propose a model that combines statistical discrimination and educational sorting that explains
why blacks get more education than do whites of similar cognitive ability. Our model explains the
difference between blacks and whites in the relations between education and AFQT and between
wages and education. It cannot easily explain why, conditional only on AFQT, blacks earn no more
than do whites. It does, however, suggest, that when comparing the earnings of blacks and whites,
one should control for both AFQT and education in which case a substantial black-white wage
differential reemerges. We explore and reject the hypothesis that differences in school quality
between blacks and whites explain the wage and education di￿erentials. Our findings support the
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In a highly inﬂuential article, Derek Neal and William Johnson (1996) argue that wage diﬀerentials
between blacks and whites can be explained by productivity-related personal characteristics (pre-
market factors). They show that the black-white diﬀerential is dramatically reduced, and in some
cases eliminated, by controlling for performance on the Armed Forces Qualiﬁcations Test (AFQT).
Since, for their sample, AFQT was administered before the individual entered the labor market,
it cannot be aﬀected directly by labor market discrimination. Therefore, either premarket factors
explain wage diﬀerentials or AFQT must be aﬀected by anticipated discrimination in the labor
market. However, Neal and Johnson (hereafter NJ) show that the eﬀect of AFQT on the earnings
of blacks is at least as large as on the earnings of whites. Therefore blacks should not anticipate
a smaller return to investment in cognitive skills. Thus they conclude that premarket factors and
not labor market discrimination account for black-white earnings diﬀerentials.1
This paper shows that in comparison with controlling for AFQT alone, wage diﬀerentials are
substantially larger when we control for both education and AFQT. The reason is that conditional
on AFQT, blacks get signiﬁcantly more education than do whites. This raises two questions. Why
do blacks obtain more education than whites with the same AFQT? Can we attribute the wage
diﬀerential to labor-market discrimination.
We focus primarily on the ﬁrst question. One possible explanation for the additional education
obtained by African Americans is that they attend lower quality schools than whites do. If AFQT
is mostly determined by school inputs, and blacks get less of an AFQT beneﬁtf r o ms c h o o l i n gt h a n
do whites, then for a given amount of schooling, blacks will have lower AFQT scores. This means
that for a given AFQT score, blacks will have more education than whites. We test this hypothesis
directly by controlling for measurable diﬀerences in school quality, and we ﬁnd that school quality
cannot explain the education diﬀerential.
We therefore explore an alternative hypothesis: that education is generally a more valuable
signal of productivity for blacks than for whites. As a result blacks invest more heavily in the
signal and get more education for a given level of ability. Our signalling model, developed below,
implies that blacks within a broad range of intermediate ability levels should obtain more education
than equally able whites, though blacks with either low or high levels of ability should obtain the
same education as whites do. This is conﬁrmed in the data when we use an appropriate measure
of AFQT as a proxy for ability.
In interpreting these results, we do not consider the AFQT to be a measure of innate ability;
1See also Johnson and Neal (1998) and the critique in Darity and Mason (1998) and the reply by Heckman (1998).
Note, however, that if AFQT is inﬂuenced by investments, then the return to AFQT is an equilibrium price. If blacks
and whites discount future income at the same rate, in equilibrium blacks and whites might well get the same return
to AFQT even if for a ﬁxed level of investment blacks get a lower return.
—1—rather we view it as a measure of both innate and acquired personal traits. We do not attempt to
explain the behavior of children and adolescents prior to the administration of the AFQT, nor do
we assume such behavior takes account of the value of investment in education or human capital.
But we do assume that students act as rational agents after the administration of the AFQT, who,
aside from wanting to invest in their human capital, are motivated by a desire to signal.
Unfortunately, our model does not explain why blacks have earnings that are similar or some-
what lower than those of whites conditional on only AFQT unless education is a pure signal at
the margin, an assumption that we ﬁnd somewhat extreme. Since for a given AFQT, blacks get
more education than do whites, they should also earn more than whites not somewhat less. The
remaining diﬀerence could reﬂect either missing variables or labor market discrimination. This is
an old debate that precedes NJ, and it is not one we will pretend to resolve. We do explore whether
the wage diﬀerential can be explained by diﬀerences in the quality of schools attended by blacks
and whites and ﬁnd no evidence to support this hypothesis.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin with the principle empirical ﬁnding: that condi-
tional on AFQT, blacks get more education than do whites. We show that this diﬀerential cannot
b ee x p l a i n e db yd i ﬀerences in the quality of the schools attended by blacks and whites. We then
present our model of statistical discrimination/educational sorting and show that it implies that
blacks get more education than whites except at very low and very high levels of ability. We also
develop the implications of the model for wage/education proﬁles. We then return to the data and
test the implications of the model. Next we turn our attention to the Neal/Johnson ﬁndings and
show that, as would be expected from the earlier results, a substantial black-white wage diﬀerential
reemerges when we control for education as well as AFQT. In the conclusion we explore the impli-
cations of the failure of our model’s prediction that blacks will earn more than whites conditional
only on AFQT.
2 Educational Attainment: Empirical Findings
2.1 The Data
Although our initial focus is on diﬀerences in educational attainment not wages, later in the paper
we will want to place our results in juxtaposition with those of Neal and Johnson. Therefore
to a large extent, we mimic their procedures. Following NJ, we rely on data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79). Since 1979 the NLSY has followed individuals born
between 1957 and 1964. Initially surveys were conducted annually. More recently, they have
been administered every other year. The NLSY oversamples blacks and Hispanics as well as people
from poor families and the military. We drop the military subsample and use sampling weights to
generate representative results.2
2Neal and Johnson also drop the over-sample of poor whites. Since having a larger sample is helpful, we retain
this group and, as noted above, use sampling weights. It will become apparent that this is not an important source
of diﬀerences.
—2—Education is given by the highest grade completed as of 2000. For those missing the 2000
variable, we used highest grade completed as of 1998 and for those missing 1998 as well, we used
the 1996 variable. Where available we used the 1996 weight. For observations missing the 1996
weight, we imputed the weight from the 1998 and 2000 weights using the predicted value from
regressions of the 1996 weights on the 1998 and/or 2000 weights.
We determined race and sex on the basis of the sub-sample to which the individual belongs.
Thus all members of the male-Hispanic cross-section sample were deemed to be male and Hispanic
regardless of how they were coded by the interviewer.
In 1980, the NLSY administered the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) to
members of the sample. A subset of the ASVAB is used to generate the Armed Forces Qualifying
Test (AFQT) score. The AFQT is generally viewed as an aptitude test comparable to other
measures of general intelligence. Like other such measures, it is generally regarded as reﬂecting a
combination of environmental and hereditary factors. The AFQT was recalibrated in 1989. The
NLSY data provide the 1989 AFQT measure. Following NJ, we regressed the AFQT score on age
(using the 1981 weights) and adjusted the AFQT score by subtracting age times the coeﬃcient on
age. We then renormed the adjusted AFQT to have mean zero and variance one.
In the later part of the paper, we also examine wages. Because of the diﬃculties in addressing
diﬀerential selection into labor force participation of black and white women (Neal, 2004), we
limit our estimates using wages to men. In order to minimize the problem of missing data, we
used hourly earnings data from the 1996, 1998 and 2000 waves of the survey. Next we took all
observations with hourly wages between $1 and $100 in all three years and calculated (unweighted)
mean hourly earnings for this balanced panel. We used the average changes in hourly wages to adjust
1996 and 2000 wages to 1998 wages. Note that this adjustment includes both an economy-wide
nominal wage growth factor and an eﬀect of increased experience. We then used the adjusted 1996,
1998 and 2000 wages for the entire sample to calculate mean adjusted wages for all respondents.
We limited ourselves to observation/years in which the wage was between $1 and $100. If the
respondent had three valid wage observations, we used the mean of those three. If the respondent
had two observations, we used the average of those two. For those with only one observation, the
wage measure corresponds to that adjusted wage. There were 237 observations of men who were
interviewed in at least one of the three years but who did not have a valid wage in any of the three
years. In the quantile regressions, these individuals are given low imputed wages except for a ﬁve
cases coded as missing for which the reported wage in at least one of the three years exceeded $100
per hour and for which there was no year with a valid reported wage.
2.2 Findings
Most labor economists are aware that average education is lower among blacks than among whites.
In our sample blacks get about three-quarters of a year less education than do whites. It is less
well known that conditional on AFQT, blacks get more education than whites do. This is shown
—3—in Table 1.3 In the ﬁrst and fourth columns, we show the diﬀerence in educational attainment
between blacks and non-Hispanic whites among men and among women conditional on age and
AFQT. Black men get about 1.2 years more education than do white men with the same AFQT.
Among women the diﬀerence is about 1.3 years. There are also smaller but statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites.
Why should blacks, and to a lesser extent Hispanics, obtain more education than whites with
the same measured cognitive skills? There are, of course, a large number of potential hypotheses.
We will focus on two. The ﬁrst is that AFQT is largely determined by schooling. The second is
that statistical discrimination in the labor market leads them to over-invest in education.
The ﬁrst explanation can be summarized as follows. Since blacks attend lower quality schools,
on average they gain fewer cognitive skills from a given level of education. Under this view, it is not
surprising that blacks have more schooling given their AFQT; they require more schooling to reach
a given level of cognitive skills. When we regress education on AFQT, we are, in eﬀect, estimating
a reverse regression.
For lower school quality among blacks to explain their greater education given their AFQT, it is
i m p o r t a n tt h a tt h ee ﬀect of schooling on AFQT be suﬃciently large. To see this, let us consider the
opposite extreme. Suppose that AFQT were fully determined before age 15 (the youngest age at
which members of the sample were tested) and therefore before students typically dropout. Then
AFQT would be exogenous to the dropout decision. The question then would only be whether
raising school quality increases or decreases educational attainment. Put diﬀerently, of two people
with IQ’s of 100 (or normalized AFQT’s of 0), would we expect the one in a higher quality school
to get more or less education than the one in the lower quality school?
Most labor economists would expect that holding other factors constant, lower school quality
would lower years of education. Standard theoretical models do not oﬀer us unambiguous results
about the eﬀect of school quality on years of schooling. In these models, the sign of the eﬀect
depends on second derivatives. The data, however, suggest a positive correlation between school
quality and years of schooling (e.g. Card and Krueger 1992a&b).
To summarize, if AFQT is heavily inﬂuenced by education and if most sample members had
completed their education at the time that they took the AFQT, then school quality diﬀerences
would provide a plausible explanation for the higher education among blacks given their AFQT. If
school quality has little eﬀect on AFQT or if most sample members had not completed schooling,
then we would expect blacks to get less education given their AFQT or given their AFQT and
completed schooling at the time they took the test. Our own view is that the AFQT measures
skills that are more heavily aﬀected by preadolescent and early adolescent education so that the
endogeneity of AFQT to ultimate educational attainment is not likely to be a major issue. However,
3See Rivkin (1995) for ﬁndings from High School and Beyond that conditional on math and reading scores, blacks
are more likely to remain in high school and begin college. Cameron and Heckman (2001) also use the NLSY and
ﬁnd that blacks get more education than whites conditional on measures of family background and note that AFQT
h a sap a r t i c u l a r l ys t r o n ge ﬀect on reversing the education diﬀerential.
—4—others certainly disagree. Therefore we address the question empirically.
Our ﬁrst approach is to measure the education diﬀerential conditional on measured school
inputs. Because the NLSY was unable to obtain school quality information for a signiﬁcant minority
of respondents, the middle column of each panel of table 1 replicates the ﬁrst column for the sample
with school input information. The principal results do not change. The estimated black/white
education gaps diﬀer by a couple of hundredths. For Hispanic men, the estimate education gap
does increase.
The third column in each panel controls for standard inputs into the education production
function. Almost none of the individual coeﬃcients is statistically signiﬁcant. Among men, attend-
ing a school with more highly educated teachers is associated with greater educational attainment.
Among women this variable and attending a school with more library books is associated with get-
ting more education. In part, the paucity of individually signiﬁcant factors reﬂects multicollinearity
among the measured inputs. In both cases, the coeﬃcients on the school inputs are jointly sig-
niﬁcant. More importantly, controlling for these factors has almost no eﬀect on the estimated
education gaps.
Table 2 repeats the exercise for individuals born after 1961 (the sample used by NJ). Only about
5% of this sample had completed schooling when they took the AFQT. While their AFQT may
have been inﬂuenced by their education up to this point, future education should be caused by skills
acquired up to this point and not the other way around. In addition to controlling for AFQT, we
now control for grade completed as of 1980. As can be seen, the coeﬃcient on completed schooling,
although statistically signiﬁcant, is small. Not surprisingly therefore, the results are similar when
we do not control for completed schooling as of 1980, and we therefore do not show the results.
For women, the education diﬀerences are similar to those obtained in table 1. Relative to non-
Hispanic white women, black women get about 1.3 years more education and Hispanic women get
about half a year more education. For men, the numbers are somewhat diﬀerent from those in
table 1. For blacks, the education diﬀerential is somewhat smaller than in table 1 but still quite
large. For Hispanics the diﬀerential is larger and the somewhat puzzling diﬀerence between those
with and without school quality data remains.
Because inputs may be a very poor proxy for school quality, in table 3 we control for measures of
school composition and student behavior. These are designed to capture some of the elements that
people think about when they think about struggling schools: high proportions of disadvantaged
students, high dropout rates and poor attendance. The results are very similar to those we obtained
in tables 1 and 2. Among all men, the estimated education diﬀerentials are similar to those obtained
with all men without controls for both blacks and Hispanics. For the younger cohorts the estimated
diﬀerential for blacks is somewhat larger than is obtained without controls. For women there is
little diﬀerence from the results we obtain without controls both for all women and for the younger
women.
Moreover, consistent with Cameron and Heckman (2002), the ﬁndings in tables 1-3 are robust
to including measures of family background (not shown). Controlling for mother’s and father’s
—5—education, number of siblings and father’s and mother’s occupation (12 categories) has little or
no eﬀect on either the coeﬃcient on black or on AFQT. Controlling for parental education does
noticeably increase the Hispanic/non-Hispanic white education diﬀerential. Based on parental
education, Hispanics would be predicted to get much less education than they actually obtain.
Before we move on, it is important to make it clear what we are not claiming. As stated in
the introduction, we are not claiming that AFQT is innate or even unaﬀected by education and
school quality. And we are not claiming that school quality is unrelated to educational attainment.
To the contrary, individuals who attend higher quality schools both have higher AFQT’s and get
more education. It is beyond the scope of the paper to address whether these relations are causal.
However, from our perspective, the simplest and most probable explanation for our results is that
the eﬀect of school quality on AFQT and the eﬀect of school quality on educational attainment
roughly cancel so that AFQT given educational attainment is roughly independent of school quality.
3 Why Blacks Get More Education than Whites:
A Signaling Model
Why then do blacks get more education than do whites with the same measured ability? In this
section, we argue that statistical discrimination against blacks creates incentives for them to signal
ability through education. We believe that ethnographic evidence supports the view that blacks
see education as a means of getting ahead. Newman (1999) ﬁnds that blacks in low-skill jobs in
Harlem view education as crucial to getting a good job and that blacks with low levels of education
have diﬃculty obtaining even jobs that we would not normally think of as requiring a high school
diploma. Kirschenman and Neckerman (1991) also ﬁnd that employers are particularly circumspect
in their assessment of low-skill blacks, a ﬁnding consistent with our approach.
Our theoretical model merges the standard model of statistical discrimination (Aigner and Cain,
1977) with a conventional sorting model. In a sense, it stands Lundberg and Startz (1983) on its
head, by dealing with observable investment in contrast with the unobservable investment in that
paper. As is standard in the statistical discrimination literature, we assume that the productivity
of blacks is less easily observed than the productivity of whites. However, consistent with our
reading of the ethnographic literature, we make one nonstandard assumption. We assume that as
education levels increase, the ability of ﬁrms to assess the productivity of black and white workers
converges.
Our strategy for analyzing statistical discrimination is to develop a game-theoretic signaling
model of educational attainment and apply it separately to blacks and to whites, by setting appro-
priate parameters for each group. Then we compare the equilibrium outcomes of the two groups.
We assume that the ability of ﬁrms to observe worker productivity increases with the worker’s ed-
ucation and that for suﬃciently high levels of education, ﬁrms observe productivity precisely. The
results would not change substantively if at that level there were additional uncertainty about pro-
ductivity, provided that the uncertainty was orthogonal to information available to either workers
—6—or ﬁrms. Economics departments may have considerable uncertainty about the future productivity
of a freshly-minted Ph.D., but their predictions are likely to be as accurate as those of the job can-
didate. We assume that, in contrast, without information revealed by the level of education itself,
employers hiring workers with lower levels of education would not know as much about potential
employees’ productivity as those workers do.
The principal result is that since they have greater diﬃculty observing blacks’ productivity,
employers put more weight on the observable signal of productivity, education, when making oﬀers
to blacks than they do when making oﬀers to whites. In response, blacks choose to get more
education.
3.1 The Signaling Game
Consider a game between a continuum of workers of diﬀerent ability levels a,w h e r ea is continuously
distributed over some ﬁxed interval. Each worker must choose a level of education s.B e c a u s ew e
assume that education and ability are complementary inputs in the creation of productivity (in a
sense deﬁned below), we shall search for a separating equilibrium in which the workers’ strategy
proﬁle is described by a continuous and diﬀerentiable function S(a), strictly increasing in a,w h e r e
s = S(a) is the education obtained by a worker of ability a. Firms in our model simply follow
the rules of a competitive labor market–they play no strategic role in the game. (But employers
beliefs about S in equilibrium are required to be correct.)
Suppose that a worker’s productivity p∗, conditional on his education level s and ability a,h a s
the log-normal distribution given by
p∗ = Q(s,a)ˆ ε, (1)
where Q(s,a) is a deterministic function of education and ability and where ε ≡ lnˆ ε is a normal
random variable with mean 0 and variance σ2
ε. Letting q(s,a) ≡ lnQ(s,a) denote the mean of lnp∗,
we can write log productivity as
lnp∗ = q(s,a)+ε. (2)
We assume that the eﬀect of education on log-productivity is characterized by diminishing returns
(qss < 0) but that ability complements the productivity-increasing eﬀects of education (qsa ≥ 0).
A potential employer can observe a worker’s education level s but not his true productivity p∗.
However, the employer does observe a productivity signal p given by
lnp =l np∗ + u, (3)
where u is a random error of observation. The error term u has variance σ2
u(s), which is common to
all ﬁrms, continuous and decreasing in s.W ea s s u m et h a tε and u are independently distributed.








If λ(s) is near 0,t h e nσ2
u(s) must be large, in which case the employer’s ability to observe worker
productivity directly is poor. Conversely, if λ(s)=1 ,t h e nσ2
u(s)=0 , and the employer can observe
—7—worker productivity perfectly. In the latter case, workers would have no incentive to signal their
productivity to employers, and they would obtain the eﬃcient level of education.
3.1.1 The Equilibrium Competitive Wage
In the candidate separating equilibrium described by the workers’ strategy proﬁle S,a ne m p l o y e r
can infer a worker’s ability a from his knowledge of the worker’s education s.I f ˆ q(s) denotes
the employer’s equilibrium inference about the value of q(s,a) conditional on s, it follows that
ˆ q(s) ≡ q(s,A(s)),w h e r eA ≡ S−1.
Proposition 1 From the point of view of an employer who has observed a worker’s productivity
signal p and education level s, the conditional mean and variance of the unobservable random
element ε is given by




Proof. Because the values of lnp − ˆ q(s) and s uniquely determine p, we know that any
expectation conditioned on p and s will remain unchanged if conditioned on lnp − ˆ q(s) and s
instead. Therefore we can write
E[ε|p,s] ≡ E[ε| lnp − ˆ q(s),s]. (6)
Moreover, (2) and (3) imply that
lnp − ˆ q(s)=u + ε (7)
in equilibrium. The proposition now follows from (6) and from standard results for the sum of
independent normal random variables.
In a competitive labor market, an employer will oﬀer the wage ˆ w(p,s) ≡ E[p∗ |p,s] to a worker
with observed characteristics p and s.W es h o w :
Proposition 2 The log of the equilibrium competitive wage is given by






Proof. We calculate the expected values of the terms of equation (2) conditional on the
observed p and s.T h i sy i e l d s
E[lnp∗ |p,s]=ˆ q(s)+E[ε|p,s]. (9)
Applying Proposition 1 give us
E[lnp∗ | p,s]=λ(s)lnp +(1− λ(s)) ˆ q(s)
and
σ2[lnp∗ | p,s]=( 1− λ(s))σ2
ε.





which, applied to ˆ w(p,s) ≡ E[p∗ |p,s], yields the proposition.
3.1.2 Workers’ Equilibrium Strategies
Each worker knows his own ability a. But a worker must choose his level of education s before
ε and u are realized. When other workers have the strategy proﬁle S(a), a designated worker’s
expectation of his wage, conditional on his own s and a,i sg i v e nb yEε,u[ˆ w(p,s)],w h e r eEε,u
integrates over ε and u.
As a ﬁrst step in deriving the best response of a worker with characteristics(s,a) to the proﬁle
S(a),w ec o m p u t et h ev a l u eo flnEε,u[ˆ w(p,s)]. From (8), (2) and (3), we see that






which is a normally distributed random variable with mean














Again, from the standard properties of log-normal random variables, we have





lnEε,u[ˆ w(p,s)] = λ(s)q(s,a)+( 1− λ(s)) ˆ q(s)+.5σ2
e. (10)
This conﬁrms the intuition that a designated worker’s expected wage depends both on his actual
ability and the ability level inferred by the employer, which in turn depends on S(a).
Workers maximize expected discounted net income. Assume that the only cost of education is
its opportunity cost in terms of lost income while in school. If r is the worker’s discount rate, the










lnv(s,a) ≡− r − rs+l nEε,u[ˆ w(p,s)].
The ﬁrst-order condition for maximizing v(s,a) with respect to s is
∂
∂s
lnEε,u[ˆ w(p,s)] = r. (11)
—9—This restates the well-known proposition that when the only cost of schooling is the student’s op-
portunity cost, the worker will continue to obtain information so long as rate of return to additional
education exceeds the discount rate r. We restrict the class of equilibria we consider to those for
which (11) has a unique solution.
We are now in a position to describe a separating equilibrium of the wage/education game among
the class of strategy proﬁles that are “well behaved” (continuous, diﬀerentiable, monitonically
increasing and specify a unique best response for every worker type).
Proposition 3 If the support of worker abilities is the interval [a0,a 1], then any well-behaved
separating equilibrium S has the property that the education level S(a0) of the lowest-type worker
must be eﬃcient and not inﬂuenced by signaling.
Proof. In an equilibrium with S(a) strictly increasing in a, the employer would infer that a
worker with education S(a0) has ability a0, the lowest level in the support. If S(a0)were ineﬃciently
high, the worker of ability a0 could safely deviate to the lower eﬃcient level of education without
lowering the employer’s inference of his ability, and so raise his payoﬀ.I fS(a0) were ineﬃciently
low, the worker of ability a0 would deviate to s>S (a0) even without consideration of the positive
payoﬀ from signaling.
We can now provide a complete description of any well-behaved equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Suppose[a0,a 1] is the support of worker abilities. If a workers’ equilibrium strategy
proﬁle S(a) is well behaved, then its inverse A(s) must satisfy the diﬀerential equation
qs +(1− λ)qaA0 = r. (12)





For λ =1 , the equilibrium condition is given by the solution for s of the equation
qs(s,a)=r. (14)
This solution of (14) deﬁnes the eﬃcient level of education, which we denote by S∗(a).F u r t h e r m o r e ,
we have S(a0)=S∗(a0) for any function λ(s).T h e r e f o r ee a c hλ(s) corresponds to exactly one well-
behaved equilibrium.














This equation implicitly deﬁnes the best response s of a worker with ability a to the strategy
proﬁle S.C o n s e q u e n t l y , a = A(s) and q(s,a)=ˆ q(s) in equilibrium, and (15) reduces to (12).
—1 0—Equation (13) follows from the fact that the derivative of S is the reciprocal of the derivative of A.
Proposition 3 implies that S(a0)=S∗(a0).
The left-hand side of equation (12) represents the worker’s rate of return to a marginal unit of
education, which, given appropriate concavity conditions and the strategy-proﬁle-inverse A,m u s t
be equated to r. This rate of return arises from the direct and indirect eﬀects of education.
First, consider the direct eﬀect of additional education on the employer’s inference of produc-
tivity when inferred ability is held constant. The direct eﬀect works through two channels. For any
given productivity signal p, additional education leads the employer to infer higher productivity,
which increases the return to education by(1 − λ)qs. But additional education also increases the
expected value of the p signal, and the increase in p causes the expected return to education to
increase by λqs.T h e s ee ﬀects sum to qs,t h eﬁrst term of (12).
Second, in equilibrium, an increase in education causes the employer to increase inferred ability.
The rate of increase of inferred ability with respect to education is A0,t h ee ﬀect of increased ability
on expected log productivity is qa and the weight that the employer puts on this inference (as
opposed to his signal) is 1 − λ. The second term,(1 − λ)qaA0, is the product of these eﬀects.
In (12), the term(1 − λ)qaA0 is always nonnegative so that for any equilibrium S(a),w eh a v e
qs(S(a),a) ≤ r. B e c a u s ew eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tqss is negative, and because the eﬃcient level of
education S∗(a) is deﬁned by qs(S∗(a),a)=r, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 5 Let S(a) describe any separating equilibrium of the workers’ signaling game. Then
for all a ∈[a0,a 1], S(a) ≥ S∗(a)
Because an equilibrium strategy proﬁle satisﬁes qs(s,a)=r whenever λ(s)=1(see Proposition
4), and because that equation characterizes full-information level of education, we have:
Proposition 6 Let s∗ be the lowest value of s such that λ(s)=1for all s ≥ s∗,a n dl e ta∗ = A(s∗).
Then for a ≥ a∗, S(a) is the same as in the case where information about productivity is perfect at
all levels of education.
3.1.3 Example: Ability as the capacity to be educated
We now analyze a special case of this model in which ability is viewed as the capacity to be educated.
Let productivity p∗ be given by
p∗ =m i n {s,a}ˆ ε,
where ˆ ε =e x p ( ε) is a lognormal random variable. This yields a special case of (2) in which q(s,a)
is deﬁned by
q(s,a)=m i n {lns,lna}. (16)
In this example, additional education is productive only when s<a .B u tw h e ns<a , additional
ability is not productive, so that the worker has no incentive to use additional education to signal
ability. When s>a , additional ability is productive but additional education is not, so if the
—1 1—worker obtains additional education, signaling can be his only purpose. Therefore, in this example,















































0f o r s>a ,
which deﬁnes the social rate of return to education. Additional education is eﬃcient so long as








This is the equilibrium level of education when information is perfect (λ =1 ).







Let ˜ S(a) be a solution of (18) From (17) we see that the eﬃcient level of education S∗(a) increases
along the 45-degree line until s =1 6and is constant at 16 thereafter. From Proposition 5, it follows
that for a ≤ 16, S(a)=˜ S(a) whenever ˜ S(a) >aand S(a)=a otherwise.
For Figure 1 we specify r = .0625 (1/r =1 6 ), and we normalize a so that the lowest level






































lna +1 , (19)
which describes the equilibrium in the region s>a(above the 45-degree line). The function S(a)
is graphed in Figure 1 with λ constant at λ0 = .692, a value calibrated to cross the diagonal at
s =1 4 .
In Figure 2, we illustrate the situation in which λ(s)=s/b (λ increases linearly in s and reaches







and if we require S(1) = 1, its unique solution is




Again, for a ≤ 16, S(a)=˜ S(a) whenever ˜ S(a) >aand S(a)=a otherwise. This is graphed in
Figure 2 for b =1 4 .N o t et h a tS(a) becomes equal to S∗(a) before s =1 4when perfect information
is obtained.
—1 3—3.2 Statistical Discrimination
We are now in a position to model statistical discrimination. The literature on statistical discrim-
ination suggests that ﬁrms observe the productivity of blacks less accurately than that of whites.
This is almost a convention in the literature, but it can be justiﬁed on the grounds that blacks
have poorer networks than do otherwise comparable whites or on the basis of language diﬀerences.
Considerable research shows that blacks and whites use diﬀerent nonverbal listening and speaking
cues and that this can lead to miscommunication (Lang, 1986).
Given that ﬁrms can observe the race of applicants, diﬀerences in the accuracy of productivity
observations induce ﬁrms to put a relatively higher weight on education and a lower weight on
observed productivity for black workers as compared with white workers. Therefore, education is
a more valuable signal of ability for blacks than it is for whites, which leads us to expect blacks
to obtain more education than whites of equal ability. This means that at any level of education,
blacks will be of lower ability and have lower wages. However, at any level of ability, since blacks
get more education, they should have higher wages if we do not hold education constant. We derive
these results formally below.
Let the subscript b denote black workers and w white workers. If black productivity is observed
less accurately than white productivity for s<s ∗,t h e nλb(s) <λ w(s) there. The following
proposition shows that under these circumstances, blacks will get more education than whites of
equal ability for all intermediate ability levels.
Proposition 7 Given λb(s) <λ w(s) for all s<s ∗, we have Sb(a) >S w(a) for all a ∈(a0,a ∗) in
equilibrium.







where i is either b or w.I f f o r s<s ∗ blacks and whites have the same values of a and s,t h e n
from λb(s) <λ w(s) we know that S0
b(a) >S 0
w(a). By the continuity of Sb and Sw and the fact that
Sb(a0)=Sw(a0),w ec a ni n f e rt h a tSb(a) >S w(a) in a neighborhood of a0.I f ˆ a is the smallest
value of a greater a0 at which Sb(a)=Sw(a),i tm u s tb et r u et h a tS0
b(ˆ a) ≤ S0
w(ˆ a), because Sb(a) is
converging to Sw(a) from above. But by (20), this is possible only if λb(s)=λw(s), which implies
that ˆ a = a∗. The proposition follows.
We can now show that at any education level (except the lowest) at which black productivity
is observed less accurately than white productivity, the expected equilibrium earnings of blacks is
less than that of whites with the same level of education.
Proposition 8 In equilibrium, for s ∈(s0,s ∗), Eε,u[ˆ wb(p,s)] <E ε,u[ˆ ww(p,s)].
Proof. Equation (10) implies that in equilibrium we have
lnEε,u[ˆ wi(p,s)] = λi(s)q(s,Ai(s)) +(1 − λi(s)) ˆ qi(s)+.5σ2
e, (21)
—1 4—which reduces to
lnEε,u[ˆ wi(p,s)] = ˆ qi(s)+.5σ2
e, (22)
because ˆ qi(s) ≡ q(s,Ai(s)). From the previous proposition, we know that ˆ qb(s) < ˆ qw(s) for s ∈
(s0,s ∗) and the theorem follows.
3.3 Empirical Implications of the Model
Let us suppose that the productivity of black workers with low and intermediate levels of education
and ability cannot be observed as accurately as the productivity of white workers with the same
levels education and ability, whereas observations of the productivity of workers with high levels of
education and ability are equally accurate for both races.
The primary implication of our model is that under these circumstances, black workers with
low or intermediate levels of ability will obtain more education than their white counterparts, but
black workers of high ability will obtain the same levels of educations as high-ability whites.
The model also has implications about the measured return to education. If we measure the
return to education by comparing wages at an intermediate level of education with wages at the
lowest level of education, our model predicts that the measured return to education should be lower
for blacks than for whites. However, if we measure the return to education by comparing wages
at an intermediate education level with wages at high levels of education, the measured return
to education should be higher for blacks than it is for whites. This suggests that as the level of
education increases, the measured return to education, not controlling for ability, should initially be
lower for blacks than for whites and then become higher for blacks than for whites. Of course, this
conclusion refers to the measured return. The actual private return to education is the common
interest rate, r, for all workers.
Since, relative to whites with the same ability, blacks with intermediate levels of ability get more
education, our model predicts that at these ability levels, blacks should earn more than whites do.
At low and high ability levels, blacks and whites should have similar earnings. Put diﬀerently,
the return to ability (not controlling for education) should be higher for blacks than for whites at
relatively low levels of ability and lower for blacks than for whites at somewhat higher ability levels.
We note that the “ability to learn” example above demonstrates that our results apply more
generally than simply to the case in which there is no asymmetric information beyond some level of
education. In the case graphed in Figure 1, with imperfect information, the wage paid to workers
with a given level of education is lower than it is with perfect information whenever the two
education levels diverge. Relative to the case of perfect information, with imperfect information,
the estimated return to education would be lower at low levels of education and higher at high
levels of education.
—1 5—4 Evidence
We begin with the prediction about the relation between educational attainment and ability. We
have already seen that conditional on AFQT, blacks get more education relative to whites. Our
model suggests that this should be true at intermediate levels of ability but not at very low or very
high levels of ability.
Table 4 shows the relation between education and AFQT, separately for men and women.
Within each sex the younger cohorts, who had not completed school at the time that they took
the AFQT, are shown separately, both with and without a control for their completed education at
the time they took the test. In every speciﬁcation, the interaction of race and the AFQT-squared
term has its predicted negative sign. This is true for Hispanics as well as for blacks.
Although the individual interaction terms are generally not statistically signiﬁcant when we
limit the sample to the younger cohorts, in no case are the diﬀerences between the young and
older cohorts in the three black interaction terms, the three Hispanic interaction terms or the six
interaction terms statistically signiﬁcant.4 Thus the results are not driven by the causal impact of
education on AFQT.
For men, the black-white education diﬀerential is maximized at an AFQT about one-sixth
standard deviation below the mean where it is about 1.3 years. Educational attainment is equal
for blacks and whites at almost two standard deviations below the mean and at one and two-
thirds standard deviations above the mean. For women, the black-white education diﬀerential is
maximized just about at the mean AFQT where it is about 1.4 years. The education levels of blacks
and whites are estimated to be equalized pretty much at the extremes of the AFQT distribution.
Figure 3 shows the smoothed relation between education and AFQT for men. The nonpara-
metric approach (which ignores the relation between age and education) conﬁrms the parametric
approach. Education levels for blacks and whites converge around a standardized AFQT of -2 and
a little above 1.5. Figure 4, for women, is less consistent with the parametric estimates. It shows
that education levels converge at a standardized AFQT between -2 and -2.5. However, education
levels for black women remain higher than for white women even at very high AFQT levels. One
potential explanation for this diﬀerence is the very high rate of labor force participation of high-skill
black women relative to white women discussed in Neal (2004).
Because of the complications associated with diﬀerences in the selection of black and white
women into the labor force, our discussion of the wage predictions is restricted to men. Our
model implies that the wages of blacks and whites will be similar at low levels of education and
at high levels but that blacks will have lower wages at intermediate levels of education. To test
this prediction, we regress the log wage on education and its square and interactions with race and
ethnicity as well as direct eﬀects of age, race and ethnicity. Table 5 shows the results. As predicted,
4The interaction between Hispanic and AFQT
2 does diﬀer at the .05 level for men. However, given that we are
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Education and AFQT by Race: Men
the return to education is initially lower for blacks than for whites and then turns more positive.
Wages for blacks and whites are estimated to be equal for those with a ﬁfth grade education and
those with nineteen years of completed education although these points of equality are imprecisely
estimated. The results of the comparison of Hispanics with white non-Hispanics are similar. If we
control for school quality, the coeﬃcients (not shown) are similar but more imprecisely estimated.
With either set of school quality measures, wages for blacks and whites converge at nineteen years
of education and at either six or seven years of education.
Figure 5 shows this nonparametrically. It plots average wages (on a log scale) for men by
education and race. There are very few individuals without any high school education and very
few blacks with more than eighteen years of education. The estimates suggest that, as predicted
by the model, wages are very similar for blacks and whites at low and high levels of education
To the extent that AFQT is a good proxy for ability, the one prediction of our model that does
not hold is that blacks should receive higher wages than whites with the same ability except at
very low and very high levels of ability. Like NJ we ﬁnd that conditional on AFQT, blacks earn
less than whites although the diﬀerence is generally small and often insigniﬁcant depending on the
speciﬁcation.5
5The model also implies that at low levels of education, the variance of earnings will be lower for blacks than for
whites but that this diﬀerence will disappear at higher levels of education. When we regress the squared residual from
the regression of the lwage on education, education squared, age and race/ethnicity on race/ethnicity and interactions
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5 Neal and Johnson Revisited
Table 6 replicates the results in NJ with our data. Many of the results can be anticipated on the
basis of our discussion so far, but we believe it is helpful to present them in the same form as in
the original NJ paper. In order to ensure that the AFQT score is not aﬀected by labor market
experience, NJ limited their sample to younger cohorts who would, for the most part, still have
been in school when they took the AFQT. The ﬁrst panel of table 1 limits the sample in the same
way. In the absence of any controls (row 1), there are large diﬀerences in the average log wages of
blacks, Hispanics and whites. In fact, the diﬀerences reported here are somewhat larger than those
reported in NJ.6
The second row shows the eﬀect of controlling for years of education completed, this reduces
both the black-white and Hispanic-white wage diﬀerentials. However, the diﬀerentials remain signif-
icant. The third row adds AFQT instead of education.7 This produces a very substantial reduction
in the estimated black-white wage diﬀerential and turns the Hispanic-white wage diﬀerential in-
signiﬁcant.
Row (3) is the basic result in NJ. Since all the variables in this row were determined before
6Derek Neal was very helpful, supplying us with the code to replicate his and William Johnson’s results. The
modest diﬀerence in our results derives from a number of diﬀerences including our decision to use the low-income
white sample, NJ’s use of the “class of worker” variable and our use of a later time period. Carneiro, Heckman and
Mastrov (2004) explores the issue of time variation in the black-white wage diﬀerential using various speciﬁcations
including those used by NJ. See also the discussion of this issue in Haider and Solon (2004).
7NJ include AFQT-squared as well as AFQT. However, since the squared term is generally not signiﬁcant and the
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individuals entered the labor market, this result seems to create a strong prima facie case that the
black-white wage diﬀerential is largely due to premarket factors that lower the AFQT of blacks
relative to whites.
Row (4) presents the principal result of this paper. If we control for AFQT and education, the
black-white wage diﬀerential increases again. The 15% wage diﬀerential implied by row (4) is both
statistically and socially signiﬁcant. The Hispanic-white diﬀerential remains small and insigniﬁcant.
Put diﬀerently, after controlling for education, accounting for AFQT diﬀerences explains slightly less
than half of the black-white wage diﬀerential While the premarket factors captured by AFQT are an
important component of the black-white wage diﬀerential, there remains a substantial diﬀerential
that could be attributable to labor market discrimination.
The diﬀerence between rows (3) and (4) is a simple application of the omitted variables bias
formula since we have established that blacks get about one year more education than do whites
w i t ht h es a m eA F Q T .Y e tb l a c k se a r na b o u tt h es a m ea sw h i t e sw i t ht h es a m eA F Q T .B l a c k sd o
not appear to be rewarded for their additional year of education relative to whites, or, equivalently,
must spend an extra year in school to attain the same level of compensation.8
Restricting the sample to the younger cohorts substantially reduces the number of observations.
The middle panel in table 6 explores what happens when we remove this restriction. There are
few substantive diﬀerences between the top and middle panel It remains true that controlling for
education signiﬁcantly reduces the Hispanic-white diﬀerential but leaves a substantial black-white
8Carneiro et al (2004) use a speciﬁcation similar to that in row (4) but adjust AFQT for schooling completed at
the time the respondent took the AFQT. They ﬁnd much larger wage diﬀerentials.
—1 9—diﬀerential. Controlling for AFQT alone, reduces or eliminates both diﬀerentials. Controlling for
both variables simultaneously eliminates the Hispanic-white diﬀerential but leaves a black-white
wage diﬀerential equal to roughly half that observed when we control for education and not AFQT.
Because the results are unaﬀected by cohort restriction, for the remainder of this paper, we focus
on the full sample.
The bottom panel of table 6 addresses the problem of nonparticipation. We treat nonpartic-
ipants as having a low wage and estimate the wage equation by least absolute deviations. Not
surprisingly since nonparticipation is greater among blacks than among whites, this increases the
estimated black-white wage diﬀerential. However, in the ﬁnal speciﬁcation, the eﬀect is modest.
Controlling for both educational attainment and AFQT, we ﬁnd a residual black-white wage dif-
ferential of about 16% or again about half of the diﬀerential that remains when we control only for
education.
If, as is generally accepted among labor economists, education is rewarded in the labor market,
then in the absence of labor market discrimination, blacks should earn more than whites with the
same AFQT. Given the education diﬀerential, the absence of a wage diﬀerential favoring blacks
when we control only for AFQT suggests that blacks are not rewarded fully for their skills.
Although NJ explore the eﬀect of also controlling for education to some extent, they explicitly
reject including education in their main estimating equation. They provide two arguments for
their position. First, they maintain that we should examine black-white wage diﬀerentials without
conditioning on education because education is endogenous. Their argument would be much more
compelling if blacks obtained less education than equivalent whites. In that case, we might argue
that blacks get less education because they expect to face discrimination in the labor market, and
therefore controlling for education understates the importance of discrimination.
However, if blacks obtain more education because they anticipate labor market discrimination
as we argue in this paper, failing to control for education understates the impact of discrimination.
Consider the following example. Suppose that the market discriminates against blacks by paying
them exactly what it would pay otherwise equivalent whites with exactly one less year of educa-
tion. Then, to a ﬁrst approximation,9 all blacks will get one year more education than otherwise
equivalent whites. Controlling only for ability, we ﬁnd that blacks and whites will have the same
earnings, but controlling for education as well as ability, we see that blacks earn less than whites
by an amount equal to the return to one year of education.
Note that even if the higher educational attainment among blacks reﬂects premarket factors,
it may still be appropriate to control for education when measuring discrimination in the labor
market. After all, we would still anticipate that the labor market would compensate blacks for
their additional education regardless of their reason for getting more education.
T h es e c o n da r g u m e n tt h a tN Jm a k ei st h a te d u c a t ion is a poor proxy for skills. In particular,
9This statement is precise if all workers maximize the present discounted value of lifetime earnings, lifetimes are
inﬁnite, there are no direct costs of education and the return to experience is zero.
—2 0—on average, blacks attend lower quality schools than do whites. Whites will have more eﬀective
education than do blacks with the same nominal years of completed education. We have already
noted that students who attend lower quality schools tend to get less education. Therefore if blacks
attend lower quality schools, for any given level of education, they will have higher unmeasured
ability. Diﬀerential school quality could lead to a spurious positive or negative coeﬃcient on race.
We address this question directly in table 7 by controlling for measures of school quality in the
wage equation. Most of the coeﬃcients have the anticipated sign. Holding other resources constant,
larger schools are associated with lower wages. Holding enrollment constant, having more guidance
counsellors, more teachers and more library books are associated with higher wages. Having more
educated teachers and higher paid teachers is associated with higher student earnings while teacher
turnover has a negative eﬀect.
Yet, controlling for inputs indicates that there is almost no eﬀect on the measured black-white
wage diﬀerential. The diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients with and without school quality controls
reﬂects diﬀerences in the sample rather than the eﬀect of adding the controls. The coeﬃcient on
black using the observations for which we have school input measures is -0.14. At least as measured
by inputs, diﬀerences in school quality do not account for the black-white wage diﬀerential.
The right-side of table 7 controls for measures of student composition and behavior. Perhaps
surprisingly, this eﬀort is in some ways less successful than the estimation using school inputs.
While higher fractions of disadvantaged students and dropouts are associated with lower wages,
average absenteeism and the fraction of students who are black are not. The results are again quite
similar to those obtained without controls for school quality.
Thus we ﬁnd no evidence that the wage and education diﬀerentials are driven by diﬀerences in
school quality. It is important to note that the absence of evidence for the role of these premarket
factors does not depend on a causal interpretation of the relation between education quality and
outcomes. It is entirely possible that attending a school with a higher dropout rate does not make
any individual more likely to dropout. Students who attend schools with high dropout rates may
have characteristics that make them more likely to dropout. Even if the dropout rate were merely a
proxy for these unmeasured characteristics, we would expect including the dropout rate to lower the
black-white education diﬀerential. The fact that it does not, supports the view that such premarket
diﬀerences do not explain the wage and education diﬀerentials.
We have reproduced all of the estimates in the tables adding controls for father’s and mother’s
education and number of siblings. Although in many cases the parameter estimates are more
imprecise, the principal results are unchanged. The major eﬀect of adding these controls is that
the estimated black-white wage diﬀerential typically falls by about three percentage points and
falls short of signiﬁcance in the speciﬁcations controlling for AFQT but not education. However, it
is not obvious how to interpret speciﬁcation which control for these factors, and since controlling
for them does not change the substance of the results, we focus on the estimates without these
additional controls.
—2 1—6 Discussion and Conclusion
While some of the principal predictions of the theory we presented are consistent with the data, it
is important to recognize that the combination of statistical discrimination and educational sorting
that we discuss cannot fully explain the data. Our model implies that, conditional on ability,
relative to whites, blacks get more education. This, in turn, implies that conditional on AFQT,
blacks should earn more than whites. But neither our results nor those of Neal and Johnson support
that conclusion for men.
One potential explanation is that education is a pure signal at the margin. This is the case in
our “ability to learn” example. In that example, while education is productive up to some point
that depends on the worker’s ability, it is unproductive beyond that point. In order to signal their
ability, most workers invest in education beyond the point at which it increases their productivity.
However, we view this model as extreme.
Our model and the supporting empirical evidence identiﬁes statistical discrimination as one
source of diﬀerences in outcomes for blacks and whites. Altonji and Pierret (2001) also provide
evidence of its importance. We have focused our attention on only one eﬀect, increased investment
in the observed signal. Blacks may also invest less in unobservable skills as in Lundberg and Startz
which would lead to them have lower wages even conditional on AFQT. In addition, the work of
Bertrand et al (2004) on names and job applications suggests to us that statistical discrimination is
of particular importance in the presence of search frictions. They ﬁnd that applicants with African
American names are less likely to receive calls for interviews than are similar applicants with names
common among whites. If evaluating workers is costly, statistical discrimination may prevent large
numbers of African American workers from consideration for many jobs. We expect that in this
setting our principal results would hold: African Americans would have greater incentives to signal
their productivity and would earn less conditional on their education. However, it is also likely
that they would earn less conditional on their ability.
Thus the results in this paper cast doubt on an emerging consensus that the origins of the black-
white wage diﬀerential lie in premarket rather than labor market factors. Blacks earn noticeably less
than whites with the same education and cognitive score. The evidence is not consistent with the
view that the unexplained diﬀerential reﬂects diﬀerences in school quality, the principal premarket
explanation. Thus, there are good grounds for believing that at least some of the black-white wage
diﬀerential reﬂects diﬀerential treatment in the labor market.
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DETERMINANTS OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
USING CONTROLS FOR SCHOOL INPUTS 
(ALL COHORTS) 
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Log(Enrollment)     -0.19 
(0.15)     0.10 
(0.17) 
Log(Teachers)     0.16 
(0.20)     0.05 
(0.22) 
Log(Guidance)     0.08 
(0.16)     -0.14 
(0.18) 
Log (Library 
books)     -0.01 
(0.05)     0.15 
(0.07) 
Proportion 
Teachers MA/PhD     0.76 
(0.19)     0.05 
(0.19) 
Teacher Salary 
$0,000s     0.26 
(0.37)     -0.34 
(0.35) 
Teachers who 
left/100     0.15 
(0.53)     0.05 
(0.48) 
N  4060 2302  2302  4337  2326 2326 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Weights for education results are described in text.  
 
TABLE 2 
DETERMINANTS OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
USING CONTROLS FOR SCHOOL INPUTS  
(YOUNG COHORTS ONLY) 
                   Men  Women 






























































Log(Enrollment)     -0.58 
(0.29)     0.02 
(0.30) 
Log(Teachers)     0.71 
(0.36)     -0.04 
(0.39) 
Log(Guidance)     0.02 
(0.26)     -0.08 
(0.33) 
Log (Library 
books)     0.04 
(0.10)     0.29 
(0.11) 
Proportion 
Teachers MA/PhD     0.11 
(0.29)     0.44 
(0.33) 
Teacher Salary 
$0,000s     0.26 
(0.62)     -1.15 
(0.63) 
Teachers who 
left/100     0.52 
(0.83)     -0.43 
(0.86) 
N  1719 913 913  1665  862  862   
Standard errors are in parentheses. Weights for education results are described in text.  
TABLE 3 
DETERMINANTS OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
USING CONTROLS FOR SCHOOL COMPOSITION/BEHAVIOR 
                   Men  Women 
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N  2336 914 2385 889 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Weights for education results are described in text. TABLE 4 
AFQT AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT BY RACE AND SEX 
  Men  Women 
  All  Young Cohorts  All  Young Cohorts 






















































































































































N  4060  1737 1719 4337 1683 1665 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Weights for education results are described in text.  
TABLE 5 
WAGES AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
(BY RACE/ETHNICITY). N&J Wages 
  Main Effect  Black Interaction  Hispanic Interaction 
OLS (N=4041) 




















Grades at Which 
Total Interactions=0   5,  19  8,.19 
All estimates also control for age. Standard errors are in parentheses.  Weights are described in 
text. TABLE 6 
DETERMINANTS OF LOG HOURLY WAGES. N&J Wages 
  Black Hispanic  Age/10  Education  AFQT 
OLS (Younger Cohorts) 





(0.14)  - - 







(0.00)  - 





(0.13)  -  0.26 
(0.01) 










OLS (Full Sample) 





(0.04)  - - 







(0.00)  - 





(0.03)  -  0.27 
(0.01) 










Quantile Regression (selection adjusted) 





(0.06)  - - 







(0.00)  - 





(0.06)  -  0.29 
(0.01) 












 TABLE 7 
DETERMINANTS OF LOG WAGES 
USING CONTROLS FOR SCHOOL QUALITY. N&J Wages  
Inputs   Student Composition/Behavior 
Black   -0.14 
(0.04) 
-0.14 
(0.04)  Black  
Hispanic  -0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.06)  Hispanic 
Age/10  0.13 
(0.04) 
0.14 
(0.04)  Age/10 
Education   0.06 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.01)  Education 
AFQT  0.14 
(0.01) 
0.15 
(0.01)  AFQT 












Log(Guidance)  0.10 
(0.04) 
-0.10 
(0.05)  Proportion Dropout 

























(0.13)    
N 2194  2223  N 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. Weights were the same as the education results in Table 3 and 
4 